The pronounced and persistent impact of the global financial crisis of 2008 motivates our empirical analysis of the role of institutions and macroeconomic fundamentals on countries' adjustment to shocks. Our empirical analysis shows that the associations of growth level, growth volatility, shocks, institutions, and macroeconomic fundamentals have changed in important ways after the crisis. GDP growth across countries has become more dependent on external factors, including global growth, global oil prices, and global financial volatility. After accounting for the effects global shocks, we find that several factors facilitate adjustment to shocks in middle income countries. Education attainment, share of manufacturing output in GDP, and exchange rate stability increase the level of economic growth, while exchange rate flexibility, education attainment, and lack of political polarization reduce the volatility of economic growth. Countries cope with shocks better in the short to medium term by using appropriate policy tools and having good long-term fundamentals.
Introduction
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 marked a watershed moment in postwar economic history of the world. Prior to the global crisis, most financial and economic crises occurred in emerging markets in Asia, Latin America and elsewhere.
While those crises inflicted a great deal of economic and social hardship on the affected economies, the spillover effects of those crises on other economies was by and large limited. For example, the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 sharply curtailed growth and caused high unemployment and other humanitarian suffering in four high-flying East and Southeast Asian economies, namely Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, but those effects did not spill over to the rest of the world. Similarly, the adverse effects of crises that Argentina, Mexico, and other Latin American countries suffered prior to the global crisis were mostly confined to the crisis-hit economies themselves.
What is qualitatively different about the global financial crisis was that it broke out in the U.S., the world's largest economy and home to world's biggest, deepest and most liquid and sophisticated financial markets. As such, it was bound to have incomparably larger effects on the rest of the world and so it proved. The crisis was rooted in the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis which, in turn, was rooted in colossal market failures in the U.S. housing and financial markets. Simply put, in their quest for yield, U.S. banks lent far too much mortgage to borrowers with poor credit ratings, fuelling a housing bubble that burst when Lehman Brothers went under. The crisis paralyzed credit flows in the U.S. and spread like wildfire across the Atlantic to Europe, due to the heavy exposure of many European banks to U.S. subprime mortgage assets.
The primary channel of crisis transmission to emerging markets was via reduction of trade and disruption of capital flows.
As credit flows seized up, business and consumer confidence took a major hit, and investment and consumption plummeted, crimping growth. The global crisis thus spread quickly from the financial markets to the real economy. The U.S. and other advanced economies went into recession and in 2009 suffered a contraction of output.
Although emerging markets as a whole grew in 2009, emerging-market growth was not enough to offset advanced-economy contraction, and global GDP fell marginally for the first and only time in the postwar period (Figure 1 ). While the decline in global GDP was marginal, the decline in global trade was more substantial (Figure 2 ). When the global crisis broke out, there were genuine, widespread fears of another Great Depression, the interwar catastrophe that devastated the world economy. In fact, only concerted, forceful fiscal and monetary policy interventions by governments and central banks around the world averted another Great Depression. There is a visible slowdown of global growth momentum since the global financial crisis. In other words, the effects of the crisis continue to reverberate. Initially, the slowdown was more evident in the advanced economies, giving rise to the notion of a two-speed economy of fast-growing emerging markets and slow-growing advanced economies. However, in more recent years, the growth deceleration has spread to emerging markets, causing the world economy as a whole to slow down. The effect of the global financial crisis on global growth is thus significant and persistent. In addition, a number of structural factors also contributed to the weakening of the world economy since 2008. For example, China's growth has moderated in recent years, largely due to structural factors such as population aging, convergence toward high income, and rebalancing toward domestic demand. Above all, population aging is not confined to China but poses an increasingly global headwind against growth. Whereas the demographic transition toward older population structures was almost exclusively a While structural factors such as population aging are also at play, the size and persistence of the slowdown of global growth momentum since the global financial crisis suggests that it is worthwhile to examine and compare vulnerability to economic shocks before and after that crisis. While it is admittedly too early to tell whether the global crisis will permanently lower the global growth trajectory, nevertheless it has so far been a game changer that has had profound effect on the global economic and The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature of studies that examine the factors which hinder or facilitate smooth growth adjustment to macro shocks. Section 3 describes the data and empirical framework.
Section 4 reports and discusses the main empirical findings. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Selective Literature Review
A key feature of developing countries is their greater exposure to domestic and external macroeconomics shocks than the industrial countries While the association between shocks, investment, and economic growth is generally ambiguous (Caballero (1991) and the references therein), the empirical research during recent decades convincingly showed a negative association between macroeconomic volatility and growth. Pindyck and Solimano (1993) showed that decade-to-decade changes in volatility have a moderate effect on investment, and the effect is greater for developing countries than for industrialized countries. Aizenman and Marion (1993) showed that policy uncertainty is negatively associated with private investment and growth in developing countries. Ramey and Ramey (1995) found a negative association between growth and volatility in a comprehensive study that included the OECD and the developing countries. 2 The study linked volatility to the debate about the cost of the business cycle.
3
European settlers, and show that this is the critical factor in explaining volatility, crises, and growth.
Macroeconomic volatility depends on economic structure -e.g. sectoral composition of output, trade openness, and financial openness -as well on the economy's institutional structure and economic policy regimes. While the openness of the economy may be given in the short run, in the long run it is the endogenous outcome of geography, history, demographics, policies, institutions, and other factors. We review below several of these channels IDB (1995) and Hausmann and Gavin (1996) found that higher volatility was associated with both lower growth and higher inequality, with the latter tending to be highly persistent. The impact of volatility on inequality was transmitted mainly through educational attainment. Furthermore, institutional shock absorbers are important determinants of macroeconomic volatility. Specifically, deep financial markets act as a shock absorber. Furthermore, the exchange-rate regime has a significant impact on volatility. In particular, pegged exchange rate regimes appear to stabilize the real exchange rate, at the cost of destabilizing real output. Switches between exchange rate regimes are highly destabilizing, suggesting that unsustainable regimes are destabilizing.
The follow up literature provided ample evidence that, for developing and emerging market countries, less flexible exchange rate regimes are associated with slower growth, as well as with greater output volatility [Broda (2004) , Edwards & Levy-Yeyati (2005) , and Céspedes & Velasco (2012) ]. In a related research by the IDB, identified the procyclicality of fiscal policy as a major amplifier of developing countries' vulnerability to shocks. Remarkably, over the last two decades the fiscal policies of about a third of developing countries have become counter-cyclical. Chile is a case in point, with institutional design facilitating smoother counter-cyclical adjustment of fiscal and other macroeconomic policies [see Frankel (2011) and Frankel, Vegh, and Vuletin (2013) ].
This discussion can be framed in the broader context of influential changes in the configuration of Mundell's Trilemma following the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system. Remarkably, emerging markets (EMs) increased their financial integration in the 1990s, a process that heightened their vulnerability to shocks. In some vulnerable countries, capital flight induced banking and balance of payment crises, crises that were dubbed as 'sudden stop crises' by Calvo (1998) and Calvo and Reinhart (2000) , and studied by Eichengreen et al. (2008) . Relevant studies include Aizenman and Lee (2007) and by Aizenman, Chinn and Ito (2011, 2013) 
Empirical Framework
In this section, we describe the data and empirical framework used for our analysis. We put together data on real GDP growth, country-specific and external shocks, institutions and fundamentals for a set of high-income, middle-income, and definitions, and year coverage are provided in the Appendix.
GDP Growth and Volatility: A First Look
For our main variables of interests -GDP growth and GDP volatility -we follow the country-income classification in Han and Wei (2015) to classify country observations into income groups, as follows:
Extremely low-income economies: GDP per capita (2011 PPP) < $1,096;
Low-income economies: $1,096 < GDP per capita < $2,527;
Lower-middle-income economies: $2,527 < GDP per capita < $5,223
Upper-middle-income economies: $5,223 < GDP per capita < $17,600
High-income economies are countries with GDP per capita > $17,600
Of course, the adjustment of GDP growth and volatility does not necessarily follow the same pattern all across countries in an income group. In any case, we will also examine the patterns of data in the whole sample regardless of the income classification.
Figure 4 plots for each income group the GDP growth and GDP volatility, respectively. Comparing across income groups, GDP growth of the upper-middle income and high-income countries have shown no tendency to fully recover from the crisis after almost ten years. These simple plots also suggest that GDP volatility declined in middle-income countries and high-income countries after peaking in 2009-2011, but remains above the level before the crisis.
Empirical Approach
The study aims to uncover how countries cope with crises and shocks. We approach the subject by looking at whether better coping mechanisms are associated, on average, with lower volatility of GDP growth, and higher average growth rates.
More concretely, the research questions for our empirical analysis are the following:
(i) What are the conditions enhancing faster and smoother adjustment of growth to shocks, especially for middle-income countries, before and after a crisis?
(ii) Is faster and smoother adjustment to shocks associated with higher average growth rate and/or lower output volatility, before and after a crisis? 
Empirical Results
In this section, we report and discuss the main findings which emerge from our empirical analysis.
Patterns of data
From an initial sample of more than 140 countries, combining the variables and dealing periods.
An alternative approach to study the data patterns is to ask how many country groups would fit with the current set of country observations. Based on the multidimensional scaling, shown in Figure 
Panel Estimation
More specifically, we want to estimate the associations between the dependent variable -i.e. GDP growth and GDP volatility -and domestic and external shocks as well as GDP growth spillovers from trade partners, using direct projections from a series of regressions for different horizon, h = 0, …, H
where Y denotes the dependent variable (GDP growth, GDP volatility); X is a vector of controls (domestic and external shocks); and are horizon-specific country and time fixed effects; spillOvr is the measure of growth spillovers emanating from trade partners; i stands for country; and t stands for time period. Impulse response for H periods is constructed from a sequence of estimated . Table 1 Figure 11 shows that shock-adjusted growth is positively associated with higher education attainment, manufacturing output, and exchange rate stability, while the shock-adjusted volatility is positively associated with higher exchange rate stability and polarization, and lower education attainment.
Focusing on the most significant variables, Figure 12 plots the data between two sub-periods for middle income countries. The scatterplots suggest that economic Source: Authors' estimates.
Concluding Observations
In this paper, we examine how economic growth and growth volatility are associated with internal and external shocks, as well as shock spillovers from trade partners, before and after the global financial crisis, taking into account country-specific economic institutions and fundamentals. Flexibility of growth adjustment is an issue of high and growing importance, especially against the background of post-crisis global growth slowdown and heightened political and policy uncertainty. The vulnerability of middle income countries to shocks is an interesting issue since these countries are typically more integrated into the world economy but, unlike most high income countries, often lack well-established policies and institutions to cope with shocks. A country's response and adjustment to shocks depends on several factors -age dependency ratio and foreign reserves, to name just two. After accounting for the effects from global shocks, for middle income countries we identify some factors that facilitate adjustment to shocks, in terms of growth and volatility. Higher education attainment, higher manufacturing output in GDP, and higher exchange rate stability increase economic growth. Lower political polarization, higher exchange rate flexibility, and higher education attainment reduce the volatility of economic growth. Therefore, overall, our cross-country findings suggest that countries can cope with shocks better in the short to medium term by appropriately using flexible policy tools -for instance, greater exchange rate flexibility help reduce growth volatility -as well as maintaining solid long-term fundamentals -for instance, higher education and lower political polarization help reduce growth volatility. 
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